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Abstract 
Cambodia's foreign exchange market is cash-based, overshadowed by the retail transactions of 
money changers. Based on the original dataset of the enterprise survey on uses of currency 
exchange services, we elucidate the structure of the foreign exchange market and investigate 
how payment dollarization is related to the prosperity of money changers. The empirical 
evidence indicates that firms in the domestic business sector confront currency mismatch 
situations that mean they have to undertake currency exchange. Besides, cash transactions are 
the most common means of payment in the country. The combination of prevalent currency 
mismatch and cash-based transactions is considered to give rise to retail currency exchange 
transactions with which money changers are more compatible than banks are. The empirical 
results also suggest that the recent regulation to promote bank lending in Khmer Riels will 
boost banks' currency exchange services, a situation conducive to foreign exchange market 
development.   
 
JEL Classification Codes: E42, G237 
Keywords: Cash-based transaction, Money changer, Currency mismatch, Payment 
dollarization, Cambodia 
  
                                            
* Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization 
† National Bank of Cambodia 
‡ National Bank of Cambodia 
 
This paper has been prepared as part of a JICA Research Institute project entitled "Empirical Study on 
the Promotion of Home Currency in Cambodia." The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions to which they are affiliated. 
 2 
 
1.  Introduction  
Cambodia's foreign exchange market is cash-based, overshadowed by the retail transactions of 
money changers (IMF 2012, 2017). To nurture a non-cash-based wholesale foreign exchange 
market, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC)—the country’s central bank—aims to foster the 
separation of retail and wholesale markets. However, restrictions on money changers may not 
ensure the development of a non-cash-based wholesale market. To assess this, we investigate the 
root causes of the fragmented foreign exchange market. 
We examine how payment dollarization relates to the structure of Cambodia's foreign 
exchange market as mentioned above. Payment dollarization refers to the condition where 
foreign currencies are used as a means of payment in the domestic business market. To 
elucidate the structure of Cambodia's foreign exchange market from the viewpoint of 
non-financial enterprises, we employ original data from an enterprise survey conducted by NBC 
and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2017. The analysis of the survey data 
allows us to examine how payment dollarization affects enterprises and how such enterprises 
shape the foreign exchange market. In addition to payment dollarization, we focus on firms' cash 
payments, in either foreign or home currencies, in the domestic business market. 
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of two 
branches of literature pertinent to foreign exchange market organization in developing countries 
and dollarization in Cambodia. In Section 3, we offer an overview of Cambodia's foreign 
exchange market paying particular attention to money changers. In Section 4, we describe the 
data from the enterprise survey relating to the uses of currency exchange services. In Section 5, 
we present the results of empirical analyses relating to (i) firms' uses of currency exchange 
services, and (ii) their choice between banks and money changers. In Section 6, drawing on the 
results of the empirical analyses, we discuss policies for foreign exchange market development. 
In Section 7, we offer some concluding remarks.  
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2.  Literature Review 
When we consider the pathway of Cambodia's foreign exchange market development, a basis of 
comparison can be sought in the work by Canales-Kriljenko (2004) which summarizes the 2001 
IMF Survey of Foreign Exchange Market Organizations in 91 developing and transition 
economies. Based on the survey results, five characteristics of the foreign exchange market in 
developing countries are presented as follows. First, the market is mainly for spot trade, thus 
forward and swap transactions are underdeveloped, which restricts the hedging of exchange rate 
risk. Second, the market is typically on-shore, the local currency is not traded in offshore 
markets. Third, the market is predominantly for the U.S. dollar trade. Fourth, trading is 
concentrated in a small number of banks; despite numerous exchange bureaus (i.e. money 
changers) in the foreign exchange market, banks have a high share of market turnover. One 
reason for this is that non-bank financial institutions are not permitted to undertake international 
transfers. On the contrary, with their customer dealing, banks can combine international 
transfers and currency exchange. Fifth, interbank dealing—foreign currency deals among 
banks—is underdeveloped. The turnover of bank customers dealing with such activities as 
purchases and sales of foreign exchange with exporters and importers is larger than the deals 
between banks. 
Foreign exchange market development is postulated as: (1) an increase in forward and 
swap deals, and (2) growth in interbank dealing. Both are interlinked as swap deals typically take 
place between dealer banks in the interbank market. The concentration of currency deals among 
a small number of dealer banks is conducive to the liquidity of the interbank market; 
concentration of order flows in some dealer banks allows them to form predictions on exchange 
rates and act as market makers (Lyon 2001). 
 4 
 
According to Canales-Kriljenko (2004), management of settlement risk is a challenge in 
foreign exchange market development.1 A foreign exchange transaction consists of two way 
transactions; the buyer's bank account—usually a nostro account in a foreign bank—is credited 
and that of the seller is debited in a foreign currency, and the buyer's local currency 
account—usually at the central bank—is debited, and that of the seller is credited. There is a risk 
that the buyer or seller defaults on his obligation, which can compound into systemic illiquidity 
of the entire foreign exchange market, and this is called the Herstatt risk (BIS 2012). Compared 
with exchange bureaus (money changers), banks whose solvency is scrutinized by financial 
regulations looking at such benchmarks as net open position are well suited for interbank foreign 
exchange transactions. Rather, dealers engaging in foreign exchange deals must have credit lines 
with counterparties in the first place, otherwise foreign exchange deals do not occur. While the 
interbank market is underdeveloped in many developing countries, banks with their financial 
positions disclosed by financial regulations are better equipped to engage in interbank deals. 
A prominent characteristic of Cambodia's foreign exchange market is the dominance of 
retail currency exchange transactions by money changers (IMF 2012, 2017). Separation of retail 
and wholesale foreign exchange transactions and the promotion of a wholesale foreign exchange 
market (interbank market) have been the NBC's long-term agenda. 
In spite of the paucity of literature that directly relates dollarization with foreign 
exchange market development, we note two crucial implications of dollarization in the context 
of Cambodia. First, due to a high degree of payment dollarization as documented in Odajima 
(2017), firms and households confront currency mismatch, and settlements of domestic business 
often necessitate currency exchange. Prevalent currency exchange for domestic business 
                                            
1 Apart from mitigation of settlement risk, one indispensable component for foreign exchange market 
development is complementary development in the money market (Canales-Kriljenko 2004; Kubo 2018). 
Pricing of forward and swap transactions requires a benchmark yield curve with market-determined 
interest rates. In developing countries, the absence of a deep and liquid money market constrains the 
development of forward and swap transactions. 
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throughout the country results in a fragmented, retail-based foreign exchange market in 
Cambodia. 
Second, Cambodia has a large circulation of U.S. dollar (USD) banknotes which 
dominates cash-based transactions in the economy. De Zamaroczy and Sa (2002) estimate that 
USD banknotes in circulation amounted to $2.9 billion in 2001, which was equivalent to 
approximately 20 times that of the Khmer Riel (KHR) currency circulating outside banks and 
seven times that of the M2 measure of the money supply at that time. Combined with currency 
mismatch, cash-based transactions thus raise the demand for frequent currency exchange 
between USD and KHR. 
Existing studies on dollarization using large scale surveys in Cambodia suggest that the 
country's banking operations are skewed towards USD-denominated loans and deposits (Siregar 
and Chan 2014; Aiba et al. 2018; Okuda and Aiba 2018). For some banks, their balance sheet is 
fully dollarized, which allows them to mitigate currency mismatch (Okuda 2017). Dollarized 
balance sheets are pronounced particularly for foreign banks, while local banks with extensive 
branch networks—for example, ACLEDA Bank— have both KHR and USD assets and 
liabilities. We examine the implications of banks' dollarized balance sheets on the foreign 
exchange market in Cambodia. 
 
3.  Overview of Cambodia's foreign exchange market 
3.1 Money changers 
Major players in Cambodia's foreign exchange market include banks and money changers. The 
Law of Foreign Exchange (August 1997) stipulates that banks as authorized intermediaries are 
permitted to undertake any foreign exchange operations with residents and non-residents, 
including purchases and sales of foreign exchange, and international settlements. Thirty-nine 
banks were in operation as of December 2017.  
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Compared with banks, the moneychangers' scope of business is restricted in two ways. 
First, money changers are not permitted to make international remittances, so that their role in 
international trade is limited. Nonetheless, for cross-border trade with neighboring countries 
where trade settlements are often in cash, money changers offer currency exchange services for 
traders. Second, money changers are not authorized for lending. Obtaining the license of a 
microfinance institution, however, allows some money changers to operate in the lending 
market as a side business. 
Money changers are classified into three types: licensed money changers, authorized 
money changers, and unofficial money changers. The Prakas (Directive) on Money Changer 
Licenses or Authorization (October 2009) stipulates that licensed and authorized money 
changers are permitted to sell and buy foreign currency banknotes and buy traveler checks. In 
Phnom Penh, there were 74 licensed money changers and 51 authorized money changers as of 
June 2018. In the provinces, there are no licensed money changers, but there are 2,580 
authorized money changers. Apart from licensed and authorized money changers, there are 
numerous unofficial money changers all over the country. 
A unique feature of the Cambodian foreign exchange market is that the central bank 
deals directly with money changers. Licensed money changers are entitled to participate in the 
KHR auctions of the NBC.2 They buy KHR liquidity in these auctions and sell it to their 
customers. They are required to deposit at the NBC a minimum paid-up capital of KHR 80 
million (approximately USD20,000) and pay an annual license fee of KHR 1.2 million 
(USD300). Authorized money changers are waived from having compulsory deposits, and they 
do not have access to the NBC auctions.  
All types of money changers are often located near wholesale markets such as the 
Olympic, Orussey, and Central markets in Phnom Penh. This implies that wholesalers and 
retailers often confront currency mismatch and need to exchange one currency for another. Thus, 
                                            
2 The detail of the KHR auction is provided in Section 3.2. 
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as their side business jewelry and gold shops often engage in buying and selling USD banknotes 
in exchange for KHR banknotes. Some of them have turned into licensed or authorized money 
changers. Soklong and Aiba (2016) show that they often undertake money transfer services, 
which is also the case for money changers in other developing countries.3 Private money 
changers have a longer track record of currency exchange business than do banks. 
The general perception among the public is that money changers offer more competitive 
exchange rates than do banks. However, the difference in exchange rates between money 
changers and banks has diminished. According to our observations of exchange rates at 20 
money changers and banks in the central district of Phnom Penh,4 the narrowest spread that a 
money changer offered was KHR 6, with the US dollar buying rate at KHR 4098 and the US 
dollar selling rate at KHR 4114. Money changers' spreads varied from KHR 6 to KHR 15. On the 
other hand, banks' spreads varied from KHR 12 to KHR 35. While some banks do not offer 
competitive money change services and instead focus on USD-denominated financial 
intermediation,5 other banks such as the ACLEDA Bank that stretch their scope of business into 
KHR deposits and loans post competitive exchange rates at branches and on the website to 
attract customers. The difference between the best exchange rates of money changers and those 
of the bank is no more than 0.2 percent. 
 
3.2 Khmer Riel auctions and the exchange rate 
The NBC has been holding one-way auctions to buy USD liquidity and sell KHR with licensed 
money changers and banks based on their demand. The auction facilitates the NBCs need to 
absorb USD liquidity and inject KHR to the economy. The auction also equips the central bank 
                                            
3 For a description of the money changer business in developing countries see El Oorchi et al. (2003). 
4 Observations were made on September 12, 2018. Twenty observations include nine banks and 11 
money changers. 
5 In fact, some foreign-owned banks did not offer currency exchange services at all. 
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to alleviate the appreciation of KHR vis-à-vis the USD. The auction thus constitutes the NBCs 
primary instrument for monetary and foreign exchange policies. 
Figure 1 illustrates the annual auction turnover by type of participant (money changers 
and banks) as well as the proportion of auction turnover to the stock of currency outside banks. 
In 2014, the auction turnover was comparable to half of the stock of KHR cash in circulation. 
However, the annual growth rate of the KHR currency outside banks was 26%, much lower than 
the auction turnover. This implies that the KHR liquidity released in the auctions has been 
partially refluxed to NBC and the banks. Other data (not shown here) on the transactions 
between the Government and the NBC indicates that the Government, whose revenues include 
the taxes and duties paid in KHR, sells more KHR than USD to the NBC.  
Figure 1 
Figure 1 also shows that money changers led the auctions until 2015 and that  their 
sales of USD to the NBC still exceeded those of the banks in subsequent years except for 2016. 
Selling USD to the NBC, they withdraw KHR cash from the NBC to deliver to their customers. 
A considerable amount of KHR liquidity moves from the NBC via money changers to 
non-financial enterprises and households, bypassing the banks.   
Several seasonal events are associated with temporary rises in demand for KHR cash. 
Before the Khmer New Year in mid-April, the demand for KHR cash is high as people going 
back to their hometowns in rural areas carry cash. Similarly, there is another hike in the demand 
for KHR cash for the Pchum Ben festival in late September to early October. The demand for 
KHR cash is also high during the harvest time of agricultural produce including rice, since 
marketing agents often pay farmers in cash using KHR. Finally, government taxes are payable in 
KHR and are often due in March, which causes a surge in demand for KHR. 
Figure 2 illustrates the exchange rates of KHR vis-à-vis the USD. In this figure, a rise 
signifies the depreciation of the KHR against the USD. The exchange rates have been stable over 
the past four years, with fluctuations remaining at less than 3 percent. Nonetheless, they exhibit a 
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distinct cyclical pattern. The KHR depreciates most in August and starts to appreciate in 
September. It appreciates most in April. Therefore, we consider that seasonal variations in 
demand for KHR cash influences the KHR/USD exchange rate. Such a pattern of exchange rate 
movement implies a high weight of cash-based retail transactions in the foreign exchange 
market.  
Figure 2 
 
4.  Enterprise survey on uses of currency exchange services 
With the data of the enterprise survey regarding their uses of currency exchange, we shed light 
on: (i) the prevalence of currency exchange originating in domestic transactions; and (ii) firms' 
choice between money changers and banks for currency exchange. We employ the data from the 
NBC-JICA survey of enterprises—the Empirical Study on the Promotion of Home Currency in 
Cambodia— for which data collection was conducted between July and December 2017. The 
survey examined enterprise use of foreign currencies for settlements and financing, the extent 
of currency mismatch between their revenues and expenditures, and their perception of 
exchange rate risk. The survey also collected data on enterprise use of currency exchange 
services, which we employ to analyze the foreign exchange market structure from the 
viewpoint of those enterprises. Drawing on the Economic Census, the survey employed 
stratified sampling by firm size and by province. Firms were classified into four categories by 
asset size; micro firms (with assets below USD50,000), small (between USD50,000 and 
USD250,000), medium (between USD250,000 and USD500,000), and large (above 
USD500,000).  
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the enterprise survey. The number of 
observations used totaled 568.6 This sample of firms was classified into 163 micro enterprises, 
                                            
6 The total sample size was 856. Dropping the observations with missing values related to expenditures 
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198 small ones, 102 medium ones, and 105 large ones. Varieties of industries are somewhat 
limited in Cambodia, and the majority of sample firms fall in the tertiary industry including trade 
and wholesale, retail, and hotels and restaurants. The composition of firm size differs 
considerably from one industry to another; for example, the proportion of large firms is high in 
the food processing and hotel industries. By contrast, the retail category is more represented by 
micro and small firms. Regarding the locations of firms, those in Phnom Penh (the capital) made 
up 19.1% of the sample.  
Table 1 
The table includes the survey results relating to: (1) the prevalence of cash payments; (2) 
the currency mismatch between revenues and expenditures; and (3) the uses of currency 
exchange, either banks or money changers, or neither. First, the average proportion of cash 
payments to total expenditures among the sample firms is as high as 72.0%, but there are some 
notable differences between micro and large enterprises. Micro enterprises have on average a 
much higher proportion of cash payments than that of large enterprises. Figure 3 summarizes the 
distribution of the percentage of cash payments in firms' total expenditures, classifying firms by 
size. The figure shows that cash is the most common means of payment among micro, small, and 
medium enterprises. However, it might not be appropriate to ascribe these differences solely to 
firm size since the composition of industry differs considerably among the four firm size 
categories. 
Figure 3 
Second, following Aiba and Tha (2017), we construct the indices of currency mismatch 
for individual enterprises as below; the currency mismatch indicator of Firm i in currency j is 
described as:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗       𝑗𝑗 = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 (1) 
                                                                                                                                
and revenues, we obtained 568 observations for subsequent analysis.  
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where 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗  is denominated in USD. 𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  are 
revenues and expenditures by currency (USD or KHR) of which the amount is converted into 
USD. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 takes the value between -1 and 1.7 For example, if a firm has all its revenues 
in USD and all its expenditures in KHR, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑗𝑗 = 1 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅,𝑗𝑗 < 0. The 
enterprises which have either 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑗𝑗 < 0 or 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 < 0 are expected to use 
currency exchange services for settlements. 
We summarize the currency mismatch indices by sector to illustrate that enterprises in 
some sectors are in severe currency mismatch. Figure 4 below depicts the histogram of currency 
mismatch indices by industry. For retailers, the histogram shows they are in KHR surplus and in 
USD deficit, implying that they procured goods in USD and sold to their customers in KHR.  
Figure 4 
Based on the currency mismatch indices, we created the currency mismatch dummy 
variables—USD short and KHR short—which indicate that an enterprise is short of respective 
currencies. As shown in Table 1, an average of the USD short dummy for the whole sample is 
0.491, meaning that 49.1% of the sample firms were short of USD. Similarly, 19.9% of the 
sample firms were short of KHR. 
The proportion of the firms running short of USD was lower among larger firms than it 
was among smaller ones. By contrast, the proportion short of KHR was higher among the larger 
firms. However, such patterns might be associated with the different composition of industrial 
sectors between large and small enterprise groups. 
Third, despite the prevalent currency mismatch, only 37.9% of the sample enterprises 
reported that they used currency exchange services.8 Some enterprises however might have 
used currency exchange services without recognizing them as exchanges. For example, some 
money changers provide the agent service of tax payments and while the taxes and duties are 
                                            
7 We assume that all enterprises have profits such that their total revenues exceed their expenditures. 
8 Exchange at money changers, exchange at banks, and no exchange do not sum up to one as some 
firms used both money changers and banks for currency exchange. 
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denominated in KHR, service providers accept payments in USD from their customers. 
Although the service thus comprises currency exchange, the customers might not recognize it as 
such. In general, larger enterprises tend to use currency exchange services more than smaller 
ones; only 27.0% of micro enterprises used currency exchange, whereas 49.5% of large 
enterprises did so. 
Regarding the choice between money changers and banks as a currency exchange 
service provider, there is a notable difference between large firms and the rest. Overall, the 
proportion of firms using banks (16.5%) is lower than that using money changers (24.5%). The 
gap between these two proportions is narrower for large firms than for the rest. Among large 
firms, 26.7% used banks while 28.6% used money changers. By contrast, among medium firms, 
13.7% used banks whereas 31.4% used money changers. Currency exchange at banks appears to 
be a more popular choice among large firms.  
The survey also contains information relating to the reasons for firms' choice between 
money changers and banks. These are summarized in Table 2. There were 139 firms that used 
money changers, and of these 18 also used banks. There were another 76 firms that used only 
banks. Among 139 enterprises that used money changers for currency exchange services, 13.6% 
(19 enterprises) chose a money changer as they did not have alternative service providers.  
Table 2 
There are some differences in reasons for firms' choice of currency exchange service 
providers between money changers and banks. Money changers are preferred for favorable 
exchange rates even though, as we have confirmed, the difference in exchange rates between 
money changers and banks has diminished. Apart from that, banks are favored by their 
customers for their secure transactions. 
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5.  Empirical analysis 
5.1 Currency exchange for domestic transactions 
Before proceeding to examine the relationship between the international/domestic trade by 
enterprises and their uses of currency exchange, we check the status of currency mismatch by 
firms. In the dollarized economy, enterprises engaging in international trade do not necessarily 
face currency mismatch as both their revenues and expenditures can be in foreign currencies. In 
such a case, they do not need currency exchange. Moreover, even in non-dollarized economies, 
enterprises engaging in international trade may combine exports and imports so that 
international trade does not always necessitate currency exchange. 
Table 3 summarizes the relationship between firms' international trade operations and 
currency mismatch. Among the 568 sample firms, there are 45 importers and 26 exporters. As 
for the exporters, only 11 firms export themselves while the other 15 use intermediaries for 
exports.  
Table 3 
Regarding imports, the proportion of firms running short of USD was lower among 
importers than among non-importers. Only 44.4% of importers run short of USD. This implies 
that more than half of all importers have sufficient foreign currency revenues for imports. 
Surprisingly, nearly half of the non-importers fell short of USD, implying that a large 
proportion of non-importers procure goods in USD and sell them in KHR. 
Regarding exports, the data show that exporters are more often short of KHR than 
non-exporters. More than 70% of the exporters run short of KHR, implying that their revenues 
are in foreign currencies while some of their expenditures are in the local currency. Still, 
23.1% of the exporters do not have currency mismatch problems because their expenditures 
are also in foreign currencies. Finally, 17.1% of non-exporters fell short of KHR. 
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These figures demonstrate two points. First, enterprises engaging in international trade 
do not always face currency mismatch; more than half of the importers appear to have 
revenues in foreign currencies. Second, currency mismatch is prevalent among enterprises not 
engaging in international trade. Combined with the fact that the majority of Cambodian firms 
do not undertake international trade, these imply that currency mismatch is prevalent among 
enterprises in the domestic business market. 
Taking into account the sample firms' status of currency mismatch, we investigate what 
firm characteristics are related to their use of currency exchange services. We examine the 
relationship between a firm's international trade and its use of currency exchange services using 
logit regression. We consider two binary variables 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, j ∈ (KHR to USD, USD to KHR). One 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if Firm i engaged in currency exchange from 
KHR to USD and zero if otherwise. Likewise, the other is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if Firm i engaged in currency exchange from USD to KHR and zero if otherwise. 
We then introduce the latent variables 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ : 
 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �1 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ > 00 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 0 
We assume the latent variables as the function of independent variables as below: 
      𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗′𝜷𝜷 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
where 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 is a vector of independent variables, 𝜷𝜷 is a vector of coefficient to be estimated, 
and 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  is a random error term. For the independent variables, we include the currency 
mismatch indices, log of sales revenue which is used as a proxy variable for the firm size, 
ownership of firms (dummy for foreign-owned firms), international trade operation (dummies 
for exporters and importers), and a dummy variable for firms which use services for tax payment 
spending USD. We also include enterprise size dummies, location dummies, and industry sector 
dummies as control variables. The probability that 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1 can be restated as 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1� =
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𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
∗ > 0� = 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > −𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗′𝜷𝜷� . Assuming that 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  follows the logistic distribution, we 
estimate the coefficient 𝜷𝜷 by the Maximum Likelihood method that yields the largest value 
for the function L = ∏𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� with the set of observations of 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, where:  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� =  �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1� 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 0� 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 0  
Table 4 summarizes the results of the regression analysis. First, firms short of a currency 
tend to carry out currency exchange to make up for that shortage. Second, larger firms are more 
likely to use currency exchange services compared with smaller ones. Third, foreign-owned 
companies do not change KHR to USD, perhaps because their business is denominated in USD, 
and they have sufficient USD liquidity. Fourth, exporters are more likely to exchange their USD 
revenues to KHR for payments. Fifth, importers are less likely to exchange USD revenues to 
KHR perhaps because their revenue is in KHR while their expenditure is in USD. These results 
are consistent with the view that the market is catering for enterprises facing a currency 
mismatch situation. 
Table 4 
Patterns of currency exchange differ substantially by region and by industry. Firms in 
Phnom Penh are more likely to undertake currency exchange from USD to KHR compared with 
those in other regions. Similarly, firms in the wholesale and retail industries are less likely to sell 
USD to buy KHR, whereas those in the hotel industry are less likely to buy USD. These appear 
to reflect diverse patterns of currency mismatch among firms. 
Overall, the empirical results suggest that the foreign exchange market caters for the 
currency exchange demand of the firms in the domestic business sector. Due to the possible 
endogeneity problem, the regression results should be accepted with some reservations. There 
can be unobservable variables that affect both a firm's degree of currency mismatch and its use 
of currency exchange. Replacing the explanatory variable with its value in a previous period 
would solve the issue. However, such data is not available.  
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5.2 Banks and money changers 
Between banks and money changers, how do enterprises choose currency exchange service 
providers? We tested hypotheses pertinent to firms' choice of currency exchange service 
providers. One is that money changers are more compatible with cash-based transactions so that 
firms with a higher percentage of cash payment in their total expenditures are more likely to use 
money changers than banks. The other is that firms in a good relationship with a bank would 
prefer currency exchange with it. As proxy variables for firms' relationship with a bank, we 
employ dummy variables for firms having bank accounts and loans and those using a bank for 
payment. 
For this analysis, dropping the observations which did not use currency exchange 
services, we ran logit regressions to see what firm characteristics are associated with their choice 
of banks as currency exchange service providers. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of one if an enterprise uses banks for currency exchange and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables include the percentage of cash payment in total 
expenditures, log of sales revenue, dummy variables for foreign-owned firms, exporters and 
importers, as well as dummy variables that capture firms' relationship with a bank. We expected 
that firms with a higher proportion of cash payments in their total expenditures would deal more 
with money changers. We also expected that firms with a close relationship with a bank would 
not use money changers.  
Table 5 summarizes the results of the logit regressions. For the baseline specification of 
Model 1, firms with a higher proportion of cash payment in their total expenditure are more 
likely to use money changers for currency exchange. For firms at the average proportion of cash 
payments, 63.1%, a 1 percent rise in the proportion of cash payments raises the probability of 
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choosing banks for currency exchange by 0.4 percent. On the other hand, the dummy variables 
representing firms' relationship with banks are all insignificant.  
Table 5 
We now take into account the heterogeneity of banks. Banks in urban areas are often 
more focused on USD-denominated business, while those in rural areas, especially ACLEDA 
Bank which has an extensive branch network into rural areas, handle both KHR and USD. 
Accordingly, we add into the regression model an interaction term of the dummy variable of 
firms having bank loans and the dummy variable of firms located in rural areas (Model 2). For 
this specification (Model 2), the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant, 
whereas the coefficient on the dummy variable for firms having loan is negative and significant. 
This can be interpreted as those firms in rural areas having loans are likely to choose a bank for 
currency exchange, while those firms in urban areas having loans are likely to choose money 
changers. On the other hand, a firms' rural area location per se appears to be neutral on their 
choice of currency exchange provider between banks and money changers. 
 
6.  Discussion 
We have illustrated how payment dollarization and prevalent cash-based transactions in the 
economy characterize Cambodia's foreign exchange market. Due to payment dollarization, 
currency mismatch occurs even among firms in the domestic business sector. At the same time, 
settlements in cash, either in KHR or USD, are prevalent in domestic business. The combination 
of payment dollarization and prevalent cash payments gives rise to the cash-based, 
retail-transaction-oriented foreign exchange market. The cash-based nature of the foreign 
exchange market is reflected in the cyclical patterns of the exchange rate caused by seasonal 
variations in demand for KHR cash. Furthermore, since money changers are more compatible 
with cash transactions than banks are, money changers dominate the foreign exchange market.  
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Without payment dollarization, exporters and importers would face currency mismatch, 
and their non-cash-based international settlements would be conducive to wholesale 
transactions in the foreign exchange market. In Cambodia's partially dollarized environment, 
importers do not necessarily confront currency mismatch perhaps because they charge their 
buyers in foreign currencies. This keeps importers away from currency exchange, which deters 
non-cash-based currency deals at banks. 
The empirical results also suggest that the commercial banks' management policy 
affects the availability of competitive currency exchange services for their customers. As 
presented by Okuda (2017), some banks—especially foreign-owned banks operating in urban 
areas—have a management policy to fully dollarize their balance sheets and keep away from 
taking a position in KHR. Such banks are reluctant to offer competitive rates for currency 
exchange, which means that their customers, including foreign-owned companies, need to 
search for other service providers including money changers. In this regard, the recent regulation 
that forces banks to have 10% of their loan portfolio in KHR will boost their KHR operations 
including currency exchange, a result conducive to the development of the foreign exchange 
market. 
An alternative policy measure to foster the development of a non-cash-based wholesale 
foreign exchange market is to promote non-cash payments. Our empirical analysis indicates that 
enterprises with a higher proportion of cash payments in their total expenditures rely more on 
money changers. Promotion of non-cash payments through the banking system would be 
conducive to a concentration of currency deals at banks and raises their turnover of 
non-cash-based foreign exchange transactions. There is a growing body of literature on the 
promotion of non-cash payments (Harasim 2016). 
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7.  Conclusion 
Cambodia's foreign exchange market is cash-based and dominated by money changers (IMF 
2012, 2017). Money changers have direct deals with the central bank, accounting for an 
overwhelming share in NBC auctions where they raise KHR liquidity to circulate KHR cash in 
the economy through currency change with customers. The cash-based market eclipsed by 
money changers makes a stark contrast to the structure of the foreign exchange market in other 
emerging economies where non-cash-based wholesale transactions between banks are the core. 
In this paper, we examined how payment dollarization is related to Cambodia's foreign 
exchange market.  
The empirical evidence indicates that firms in the domestic business sector confront 
currency mismatch, meaning that they need to undertake currency exchange. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence also suggests that money changers are more compatible with cash-based 
transactions than banks are; enterprises with a higher proportion of cash payments in the total 
expenditures tend to use money changers rather than banks. Thus, the combination of prevalent 
currency mismatch even among firms in the domestic business market and their dependence on 
cash-based settlements results in the prosperity of money changers in Cambodia's foreign 
exchange market. 
 Finally, the recent regulation that forces commercial banks to have 10% of their loan 
portfolio in KHR could be a stimulus to promote their currency exchange services. The 
regression analysis of choice of currency exchange service providers suggests that firms in a 
good relationship with a bank tend to choose that bank as long as it offers competitive rates for 
currency exchange. However, those banks that dollarize their balance sheets to mitigate 
exchange rate risk do not offer competitive currency exchange services, which drives their 
customers to money changers. As the regulation will force banks to stretch their scope of 
 20 
 
business to KHR operations, more banks are expected to offer competitive currency exchange 
services, which in turn will be conducive to the development of the foreign exchange market. 
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Figure 1: KHR auctions by the National Bank of Cambodia, 2011-2018  
 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia. 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Au
ct
io
n 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 a
s 
%
 o
f C
ur
re
nc
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
Ba
nk
s
Au
ct
io
n 
Tu
rn
ov
er
, U
SD
 m
illi
on
Moneychangers Banks % of Currency outside Banks
 23 
 
Figure 2: Daily market exchange rates, KHR per USD, April 2014 to December 2018  
 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia. 
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Figure 3: Enterprise use of cash in expenditures, by enterprise size and by industry 
 
(A) By enterprise size 
 
 
(B) By industry 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 4: Currency mismatch by industry 
 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Table 1: Survey results 
 
Source: Authors. 
  
Enterprize size category Total Micro Small Medium Large
Frequency 568 163 198 102 105
  By industry
Food processing 26 3 5 3 15
Trade motor cycle 87 24 43 11 9
Trade 60 12 29 14 5
Retail 138 67 51 16 4
Hotel 112 9 30 32 41
Restaurant 33 12 12 6 3
Others 112 36 28 20 28
 By location
Phnom Penh 109 35 36 25 13
Siem Reap 53 10 9 13 21
North-East 38 15 9 6 8
North-West 23 5 13 2 3
Central 142 48 50 26 18
South-East 119 36 49 16 18
South-West 84 14 32 14 24
Average
Log of sales revenue 9.18 8.08 9.13 9.42 10.77
Proportion of chash payment in
total expenditure
72.0 83.8 67.8 66.3 67.1
Located in rural township 0.327 0.399 0.399 0.196 0.210
Foreign-owned company 0.033 0.025 0.015 0.039 0.076
USD short (Yes=1, No=0) 0.491 0.472 0.591 0.471 0.352
KHR short (Yes=1, No=0) 0.199 0.166 0.121 0.216 0.381
Exchage at money changers (Yes=1, No=0) 0.245 0.184 0.237 0.314 0.286
Exchange at banks (Yes=1, No=0) 0.165 0.110 0.172 0.137 0.267
No exchange (Yes=1, No=0) 0.621 0.730 0.616 0.578 0.505
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Table 2: Reasons for choice of currency exchange service providers 
 
Source: Authors. 
  
Enterprises
which use
money changers
Enterprises
which use
banks only
Number of observations 139 76
Reasons for choice
(% of relevant observations)
1. Don't know alternative service providers. 13.7 2.6
2. Location is near. 46.0 56.6
3. Price is favorable. 73.4 47.4
4.Service is convenient. 78.4 72.4
5.Transaction is safe. 21.6 47.4
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Import 20 (44.4%) 25 (55.6%) 45 (100%)
No import 259 (49.5%) 264 (55.5%) 523 (100%)
Total 279 (49.1%) 289 (50.9%) 568 (100%)
USD short
Import
Yes No Total
Table 3: Relationship between enterprises' international trade and currency mismatch 
 
(A) Imports 
 
(B) Exports 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
  
Direct export 9 (81.8%) 2 (18.2%) 11 (100%)
Export with middlemen 11 (73.3%) 4 (26.7%) 15 (100%)
No export 93 (17.2%) 449 (82.8%) 542 (100%)
Total 113 (19.9%) 455 (80.1%) 568 (100%)
Export
KHR short
Yes No Total
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Table 4: Results of the regression analysis: use of currency exchange services by firms 
 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ***, **, and * stand for the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. p-values are 
calculated with robust standard errors. Marginal effects of continuous variables are evaluated at their 
mean.  
Dependent variable
Marginal
effect
p-value
Marginal
effect
p-value
Explanatory variable
Currency mismatch, USD (-1 to 1) -0.731 *** 0.000
Currency mismatch, KHR (-1 to 1) -0.620 *** 0.000
Log of sales revenue 0.051 *** 0.003 0.029 * 0.071
Dummy: (Yes=1, No=0)
  Have exports -0.128 0.354 0.326 ** 0.032
  Have imports 0.140 0.114 -0.131 * 0.086
  Foreign owned company -0.580 *** 0.000 0.323 0.113
  Pay tax using USD 0.001 0.991
Region dummy (Phnom Penh=0)
 Siem Reap 0.108 0.258 -0.029 0.751
 North-East Area 0.037 0.741 -0.200 ** 0.025
 North-West Area 0.111 0.475 -0.147 0.245
 Central Area 0.224 *** 0.002 -0.095 0.178
 South-East Area 0.282 *** 0.000 -0.140 * 0.052
 South-West Area 0.165 ** 0.045 -0.133 * 0.075
Industry dummy (Other industries=0)
 Foodprocess -0.1211 0.340 -0.108 0.294
 Trade & wholesale (motorcycle & vehicle) 0.0181 0.841 -0.064 * 0.387
 Trade & wholesale (others) 0.0232 0.807 -0.273 *** 0.002
 Retail -0.0582 0.435 -0.203 *** 0.003
 Hotel -0.1819 ** 0.021 -0.019 0.763
 Restaurant -0.2525 ** 0.014 0.056 0.567
Number of observations 568 568
Log pseudolikelihood -277.97 -268.81
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.259
Model 1
Exchange from
KHR to USD (Yes=1, No=0)
Model 2
Exchange from
USD to KHR (Yes=1, No=0)
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Table 5: Results of the regression analysis: choice of currency exchange service providers 
 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ***, **, and * stand for the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. p-values are 
calculated with robust standard errors. Marginal effects of continuous variables are evaluated at their 
mean. 
Dependent variable  
Marginal
effect
p-value
Marginal
effect
p-value
Explanatory variable
Proportion of cash payment in
total expenditure
-0.004 ** 0.023 -0.004 ** 0.022
Log of sales revenue 0.032 0.282 0.032 0.282
Dummy variable: (Yes=1, No=0)
  Foreign owned company -0.021 0.895 -0.052 0.741
  Have export 0.085 0.558 0.064 0.661
  Have import -0.020 0.868 -0.024 0.844
  Have bank account 0.035 0.720 0.036 0.709
  Have bank loan -0.047 0.584 -0.192 * 0.081
  Use banks for payment 0.128 0.256 0.123 0.271
  Administrative location is rural area 0.252 *** 0.005 0.142 0.209
  (Rural area) x (Have bank loan) 0.407 ** 0.031
Region dummy (Phnom Penh=0)
 Siem Reap -0.096 0.489 -0.077 0.582
 North-East Area 0.256 0.149 0.272 0.136
 North-West Area -0.239 * 0.087 -0.231 * 0.085
 Central Area 0.201 0.140 0.225 * 0.099
 South-East Area 0.172 0.231 0.217 0.152
 South-West Area -0.136 0.292 -0.128 0.330
Industry dummy (Other industries=0)
 Foodprocess 0.042 0.817 0.015 0.931
 Trade & wholesale (motorcycle & vehicle) -0.146 0.281 -0.149 0.277
 Trade & wholesale (others) -0.115 0.401 -0.123 0.372
 Retail -0.307 *** 0.023 -0.310 ** 0.022
 Hotel 0.003 0.981 -0.007 0.963
 Restaurant 0.399 * 0.063 0.423 ** 0.050
Number of observations 215 215
Log pseudolikelihood -119.80 -117.65
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.201
Model 1 Model 2
Use banks for exchange Use banks for exchange
(Yes=1, No=0) (Yes=1, No=0)
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Abstruct (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
カンボジアの外国為替市場は現金取引が主で、両替商の小売取引が中心である。本
稿では、通貨交換サービスの利用に関する企業調査個票データを用いて、決済ドル化
が両替商の興隆といかに結びついているかに着目して外国為替市場の構造を解明する。
データからは、地場のビジネスであっても多くの企業が通貨ミスマッチに直面し、両
替を必要としていることが示された。さらに、企業の決済手段が現金決済に留まって
いることともあいまって、現金の外貨両替が広がり、銀行に比べて現金両替の利便性
の高い両替商が重用されている。他方、実証分析の結果は、リエル建ての貸し出しを
促す銀行規制が、銀行の両替業務を後押しして、外国為替市場の発展につながること
も示唆している。 
 
キーワード: 現金取引、両替商、通貨ミスマッチ、決済ドル化、カンボジア 
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